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EUROPEAN CLASS ACTIONS
Michelle Parsons*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have meant new and exciting renovations to the laws in
European countries, as many countries introduced their first group action
legislation. Though varying in scope and form, these actions have presented
the opportunities for plaintiffs to bundle their claims and bring collective
actions before the court. However, the changes are far from finished and the
area of class actions is in an exciting period of expansion. These developments
have spurred greater interest in the topic, and some European countries have
looked to the United States as a guide for what to emulate or avoid in class
action legislation. The following paper provides a general review of US class
action law today, with an evaluation of its positive and negative attributes.
Then, the article undertakes a more detailed assessment of collective claims in
several European countries, as well as a glance at the projected future for
European class actions as a whole.
II. UNITED STATES
Class actions began in the United States with the 1938 adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The law was “an invention of equity,
allowing certain groups of individuals with common interests to enforce their
rights in a single suit.”2 The use of class actions did not develop with any
consistency; however, until the 1966 amendment of Rule 23, the federal class
action rule.3 Coinciding with the growth of civil rights, some felt the
amendment itself was targeted at social reform.4 Others felt it targeted the
business community, making it vulnerable to more devastating suits at the
hands of consumers.5 In the 1980s, US courts began to expand the types of
*
Attorney, SC Office of the Attorney General, JD & MPA, University of South
Carolina, 2007. Ms. Parsons would like to thank Professor Nathan Crystal for all of his
assistance with this article, as well as the hardworking staff of the South Carolina
Journal of International Law & Business.
1
Linda A. Willett, US-Style Class Actions in Europe: A Growing Threat?, 9
NAT’L LEGAL CENTER FOR PUB.INT. 1, 2 (2005).
2
Id. at 2-3 (quoting Edward F. Sherman, American Class Actions: Significant
Features and Developing Alternatives in Foreign Legal Systems, 215 F.R.D. 130, 132
(2003)).
3
Id. at 3.
4
Id.
5
Id.
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suits that qualify for class actions in an effort to lessen the burden that the
individual suits would have on the courts. 6 The use of class actions has
steadily increased from this time until the present day.
In a US class action, one or more individuals may represent a larger
group of people with similar claims by bringing a suit on their behalf.7 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) outlines the following prerequisites applicable to
all types of class actions:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims and defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.8
While a class must meet these prerequisites in order to be certified as
a class action, it must also meet additional standards.9 Under Rule 23(b), three
types of class actions are recognized:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of

6

a.

inconsistent or varying adjudications with
respect to individual members of the class
which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class; or

b.

adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests
of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or
impeded their ability to protect their interests;
or

Id. at 4.
Id.
8
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
9
Id. at 23(b).
7
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(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby
making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class
as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.10
In determining whether the questions of law or fact of the class
predominate over the questions of the individual class members, Rule 23
instructs the court to consider the following: the level of interest that
individual class members would have in individually controlling their suit, the
extent to which the controversy is already being litigated by or against
individuals within the class, the desirability or lack thereof of litigating all of
the claims in one forum, and the difficulties that may arise in the management
of the class action.11 Once these factors are weighed and the standards are met,
the court may certify the action as a class by court order.12
However, all class members, including those who are absent, are
bound by the judgment resulting from the suit.13 If members of the class do not
wish to be bound by the suit and the suit is for monetary damages, these
individuals must be given a chance to opt out of the suit and to bring an
individual suit later. 14
The contingency fee is one feature that distinguishes US class actions
and has been part of the US system since the early nineteenth century.15 In this
payment system, the lawyer’s fee is conditional on recovery of damages.16
However, the contingency fee can also result in a windfall to the plaintiff’s
attorney; and many critics claim the contingency fee motivates class actions. 17
Because lawyers claim up to 40% of the final award, critics argue that they are

10

Id.
Id. at 23(b)(3).
12
Id. at 23(c)(1)(A).
13
Willett, supra note 1, at 4.
14
Id.
15
Willett, supra note 1, at 9.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 9-10.
11
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able to fund speculative claims that would otherwise be financially risky.18
The increase in private securities class actions within the United States
demonstrates the ability to take on more speculative cases.19 From 2003 to
2005, these types of actions increased by 16%.20
The United States underwent substantial class action reform in 2005.
In February 2005, President George W. Bush signed a law aimed at deterring
frivolous class actions, which he claimed inflated the cost of US legal fees,
civil awards, and settlements nationwide to the sum of $240 billion per year.21
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 gave federal courts jurisdiction over
any class action where the amount in controversy is in excess of $5 million
and the defendant is from the same state as less than one-third of the
plaintiffs.22 In addition, the Act “limits the recovery of contingent fees by
attorneys in settlements where plaintiffs are awarded coupons, establishes
guidelines that federal district courts are to follow before approving
settlements, and specifies requirements for serving notice of proposed
settlements on federal and state officials.”23
Many note ironically that the expansion of European class actions
seems to coincide with the US measures to scale back the class action
phenomena.24 A more in-depth examination of the expansion of class actions
in Europe requires an assessment of individual countries. The remainder of
this article will take a closer look at the status of class actions in the United
Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, France and Germany, while
comparing them to each other, as well as the United States. The examination
of Germany will focus on its recent implementation of an innovative collective
claims system. Finally, the article will look at France, which has a collective
claims system in place, but has begun the controversial step of pursuing a class
action system similar to that of the United States.

18

Bob Sherwood & Nikki Tait, Business Life The Professions: Class Actions
Across the Atlantic, FIN. TIMES UK, June 16, 2005, at 4.
19
Lori Calabro, In Your Own Defense, CFO EUROPE.COM, May 2005, available at
http://www.cfoeurope.com/displayStory.cfm/3929323.
20
Id.
21
Sherwood & Tait, supra note 18, at 4.
22
John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and the
Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L. REV. 1021, 1033-34 (2005); See Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-002, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
23
Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 22, at n.61.
24
Sherwood & Tait, supra note 18, at 3.
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III. UNITED KINGDOM

Representative actions have been available in the United Kingdom for
over two hundred years, but claimants rarely used this type of action “due to
‘narrow court interpretations’ and inapplicability to matters ‘where the sole
relief sought damages that would have to be proved individually.’”25 Class
actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief are increasingly more
frequent in the United Kingdom; but expansion in collective action law has
also enabled class action claimants to seek damages, broadening the use of
collective actions overall.26
There are several methods of collective action in the United
Kingdom.27 Parties with the same claim may join together. 28 Further, when
more than one party has the “same interest” in a claim, they may bring a
representative action.29 Courts may order damages in representative actions
where “(a) the class members’ loss can be readily ascertained at the time of
judgment and (b) class members have waived their rights to individual receipt
of damages and instead wish their compensation to be paid to a body that
represents their interests.”30 Like the United States, these actions can be
initiated without court permission.31 Unlike the United States, the courts do not
closely supervise these actions and settlements do not usually require court
approval.32 Representative actions are rare, in part because they require the
relief sought to be beneficial to all represented claimants.33
The more common form of collective action is called a group
action.34 Group actions can be compared to the Rule 23(b)(3) class actions of
the United States, as they are discussed in the preceding section. Group actions
occur “when there are multiple claimants and common issues of law or related
25

Willett, supra note 1, at 6 (quoting Edward F. Sherman, American Class
Actions: Significant Features and Developing Alternatives in Foreign Legal Systems,
215 F.R.D. 130, 174 (2003)).
26
Id. at 6-7.
27
Mark Clough & Arundel McDougall, The United Kingdom Report, at 7, in
DAMAGES ACTIONS FOR THE INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION LAW
AS LAID DOWN IN ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/national_re
ports/united_kingdom_en.pdf (last visited on Feb. 6, 2007).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Willett, supra note 1, at 6.
31
Id. at 7.
32
Id.
33
Clough & McDougall, supra note 27, at 7.
34
Id.
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fact under a Group Litigation Order.”35 This form of litigation developed from
the “European Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers,”
passed by the European Parliament & Council in 2000.36 The Directive states
that a representative must have “advanced determination of the right to serve
as a representative rather than allowing the American or representative action
‘self-selective approach.’”37 In further contrast to representative actions, the
court strictly supervises group litigation orders.38 A senior judge must consent
to the group litigation order (GLO) and the court may make a group litigation
order whenever a number of claims possess shared or connected issues of fact
or law.39 A GLO specifies the issues to which it applies and requires a group
register of the claims that it governs.40 Group claims are transferred to the
management court, which will also address any future GLO claims.41 Under
GLOs, one or more of the claims are used as test cases and the others are
delayed until further notice.42 Any judgment or order made regarding the
group register claim is binding on the parties to all other claims, unless the
court directs otherwise.43 From 2000 to mid 2005, since group litigation orders
became available in the United Kingdom, forty-nine such suits have been
registered.44
A plaintiff in the United Kingdom has several potential fee situations
to examine prior to bringing suit. As in Canada and Australia, UK claimants
must consider the “loser pays” rule.45 Analyzing the United Kingdom payment
system, David Gold, a Herbert Smith senior partner, noted, “Where is the
incentive for class actions? Unless you give lawyers real incentives to bring
these class actions, they won’t happen.”46 The “loser pays” rule requires the
party that settles or loses the case to pay the prevailing party’s legal
expenses.47 In situations where legal aid funded the claimant’s case because
35

Id. (citing Civil Procedure Rule[hereinafter CPR] Part 19, Rule 19.11).
Willett, supra note 1, at 7.
37
Id. (quoting Edward F. Sherman, American Class Actions: Significant Features
and Developing Alternatives in Foreign Legal Systems, 215 F.R.D. 130, 144 (2003)).
38
Clough & McDougall, supra note 27, at 7.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. (citing CPR Rule 19.12(1)(a)).
44
Sherwood & Tait, supra note 18, at 2.
45
Ted Allen, Interest in Class Actions Growing Outside the US, SCAS ALERT,
June 2005, at 5, available at http://slw.issproxy.com/securities_litigation_blo
/2005/06/the_state_of_fo.html (citing Peter Burbidge, law professor at Westminster
University).
46
Sherwood & Tait, supra note 18, at 4.
47
Willett, supra note 1, at 11.
36
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the claimant would not have been able to pay the cost of potential loss, the rule
is not applied.48 Additionally, the United Kingdom has a conditional fee
system that translates to a “no-win-no-fee system with a success fee based on
hours worked at a percentage uplift related to the risk but capped at 100%.”49
The United Kingdom’s legal system shares several features with the
United States that are not common in the rest of Europe. While most of the
European Union has banned lawyer advertising, the United Kingdom has
permitted such advertising since the 1970s.50 Additionally, the United
Kingdom, Ireland and Cyprus are alone in recognizing punitive damages,
“though they are rarely awarded.”51
Currently, securities class actions are a focal point of discussion in
the United Kingdom. The UK law does not provide for securities class actions,
but does allow investors to form associations that may bring suit against the
company in question.52 In the UK, company directors do not have a legal
obligation to their shareholders; rather, their legal obligation is to the
company.53 Additionally, in April 2005, the UK Companies Act was amended
to allow companies to indemnify directors against third-party claims.54
The recent Railtrack case illustrated the difficulties of bringing a
class action in the United Kingdom. 55,000 former Railtrack investors raised
£2.4 million to bring suit against government officials for misfeasance and
damages to the shareholders’ interest due to the company’s collapse in 2001.55
The High Court stalled the case when it refused to limit the potential liability
of the Railtrack shareholders to £1.35 million for defense legal bills under the
loser pays system.56 Eventually, the plaintiffs lost the case when they failed to
convince the High Court that the Transportation Secretary had acted with
misfeasance.57 Thus, they were liable for attorney’s fees, demonstrating the
high risk that must be weighed when deciding to pursue a class action in
Europe.
48

Id.
Id. at 10-11 (quoting Christopher Hodges, European Law Reform, Center for
Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford, Wolfson College (Apr. 2004) at 2).
50
Id. at 14.
51
Michael Freedman, Abogados, Advokaters, Advocaten, FORBES, Dec. 27, 2004
at 1.
52
Allen, supra note 45, at 5.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Defeat for Railtrack Shareholders, BBC NEWS, Oct. 14, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4340794.stm.
49
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IV. SWEDEN

Sweden was the first European Union country to introduce a class
action equivalent to that of the United States.58 On January 1, 2003, Sweden
introduced the Class Action Act.59 The Act allows the following group actions:
private class actions, organizational class actions, and public class actions.60 A
private class action may be initiated by any person or entity that is both a
member of the class and has his own claim.61 The Swedish Government has
proposed a potential elimination of this standing requirement so that
individuals affected by situations such as competition law infringement could
bring a suit where a party was injured without a contracting relationship with
the infringing party.62
Organizational class actions occur when an organization brings a
claim without having a claim of its own.63 Both consumer and labor
organizations may bring these actions and they generally relate to suits
between consumers and providers of goods and services.64
Public class actions develop when the Swedish Government appoints
an authority to act as a plaintiff and litigate on behalf of an injured class.65 The
government pursues these class actions when it appears that doing so would
benefit the greater public interest.66 A government committee examining the
issue proposed that the Competition Authority should not be granted
permission to bring class actions because the public law system sanctions
competition sufficiently; thus, such action would not contribute to the public
interest.67 Rather, the government decided that the Consumer Ombudsman and
58

Judge M. Nordh, Remarks on the Swedish Group Proceeding Act (June 2, 2005)
available
at
http://www.courdecassation.fr/manifestations/colloques
at
1,
/Colloques2005/actions_collectives/judge_nordh.pdf.
59
Tommy Pettersson, et al., The Sweden Report, at 4, DAMAGES ACTIONS FOR THE
INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION LAW AS LAID DOWN IN ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC,
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/
private_enforcement/national_reports/sweden_en.pdf (citing lag (2002:599) om
grupprattegang) (last visited on Feb. 5, 2007).
60
GROUP PROCEEDING FACT SHEET, SWEDEN, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Ju 02.10e
(Dec. 2002) at 1, available at http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c4/34/47
/6cd3ccdf.pdf (referring to the Swedish Group Proceedings Act (2002:599).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at Annex I, p. 21.
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the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency should be authorized to bring
public class actions.68
SFS 2002:599, Section 8, of the Swedish Code of Statutes places the
following limitations on group actions:
A group action may only be considered if:
(1) the action is founded on circumstances that are common
or of a similar nature for the claims of the members of
the group,
(2) group proceedings do not appear to be inappropriate
owing to some claims of the members of the group, as
regard grounds, differing substantially from other
claims,
(3) the large part of the claims to which the action relates
cannot equally well be pursued by personal actions by
members of the group,
(4) the group, taking into consideration its size, ambit, and
otherwise is appropriately defined, and
(5) the plaintiff, taking into consideration the plaintiff’s
interest in the substantive matter, the plaintiff’s financial
capacity to bring a group action and the circumstances
generally, is appropriate to represent the members of the
group in the case.69
The Swedish Class Action Act allows claimants to “opt in” to a group
action in which the decision would bind all of the litigants in the group.70 This
“opt in” system contrasts with the United States, which is an “opt out”
system.71 In order to opt into a Swedish class action, class members must give
written notice to the court, and only these members “will be allowed to
participate in the proceedings as passive members of the class.”72 The failure
to give written notice to the court within the time period dictated by the court

68

Id. at 1.
8 § Special Preconditions for Proceedings (Swedish Code of Statutes [SFS]
2002:599).
70
Sherwood & Tait, supra note 18, at 1.
71
Willett, supra note 1, at 4.
72
Pettersson et al., supra note 59, at 4.
69
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results in the individual’s withdrawal from the group.73 To initiate a class
action, one must be an individual, legal person, organization, or authority with
special permission from the government.74 Importantly, the Group Proceedings
Act allows for damages, but only for various environmental damage claims.75
Additionally, plaintiffs may make an agreement with their attorney
that the litigation fees shall be determined by the success of the case, but the
agreement requires court approval in order to be asserted against the members
of the group.76 Thus, a form of contingent fees exists, as “the attorney will
receive a particularly high payment if the group wins the case and little or no
payment if the group loses.”77 The court may also determine in advance the
amount of compensation a lawyer should receive, if this is reasonable in light
of the estimated time and work that will be involved.78 If the person
representing the class settles, the court must approve the settlement for it to be
valid for the whole class.79 In granting its approval, the court ascertains
whether or not the settlement “discriminate[s] against particular members of
the group or [is] in another way manifestly unfair.”80
Sweden adheres to the rule that the loser pays the costs of the
proceedings and applies this rule to group actions as well. 81 However, as the
members of the group are not actual parties to the proceedings, they are not
liable for the costs.82 This general rule does have some exceptions, but where
members of the group do have to pay some costs, these costs shall “never
exceed the sum accruing to them as a result of the proceedings.”83 An example
of an exception would be if a member of the group increased the cost of
litigation through “carelessness or oversight.”84 In such a situation, the
member would have to pay the increased costs.85
As of the summer of 2005, very few actions had been filed in
Sweden.86 At that time, the following three cases were pending: a suit by five
73

Swedish Code of Statutes, supra note 69, §14, at 4.
Pettersson et al., supra note 59, at 4.
75
Group Proceeding Fact Sheet, supra note 60, at 1.
76
Swedish Code of Statutes, supra note 69, § 38, at 8.
77
Group Proceeding Fact Sheet, supra note 60, at 2.
78
Swedish Code of Statutes, supra note 69, § 30 at 6.
79
Group Proceeding Fact Sheet, supra note 60, at 2.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Swedish Code of Statutes, supra note 69, §37.
85
Id.
86
Nordh, supra 58, at 5.
74
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hundred airline passengers against a travel agency, a suit brought by
approximately 7,000 individuals against an electric company, and a suit
involving only seven members and individual claims of around €20.87 The
scarcity of pending suits illustrates that potential claimants are not utilizing the
law of class actions in Sweden. Thus, while the law may closely resemble the
United States, it is employed in far fewer cases.
V. THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands has a limited class action law in place.88 Class action
claimants may pursue court orders, rescission of contracts, and refunds;
however, they may not seek punitive damages.89
In the Netherlands, collective claims and representative actions may
be filed by special-purpose associations.90 The groups must demonstrate they
have defined and pursued a specific purpose. Article 3:305a CC states:
A foundation or association with full legal capacity can
institute an action intended to protect similar interests of
other persons to the extent that its articles promote such
interests.... A legal person referred to in paragraph 1 shall
have no locus standing if, in the given circumstances, it has
not made a sufficient attempt to achieve the objective of the
action through consultation with the defendant.91
Article 3:305a Section 3 CC limits a legal person from claiming
damages by stating that the object of the action “may not be to seek monetary
compensation.”92 Rather, the object may be to have an order against the
defendant published, as determined by the court, and at the defendant’s
expense.93 Plaintiffs will often institute joint actions to avoid these 3:305
limitations.94 This is accomplished by either obtaining the same lawyer or “by

87

Id.
Allen, supra note 45, at 6.
89
Id.
90
Weyer VerLoren van Themaat, et al., The Netherlands Report, at 3, DAMAGES
ACTIONS FOR THE INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION LAW AS LAID
available
at
DOWN
IN
ARTICLES
81
AND
82
EC,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/national_re
ports/netherlands_en.pdf (last visited on Feb. 6, 2006).
91
Id. at 4.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
88
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assignment of individual claims to a particular (legal) person.”95 Thus, the
claims are “bundle[d]” and “joined procedurally.”96
As in the United States, the Dutch Parliament has made representative
action settlements binding on all class members, with the exception of those
who opt out.97 However, unlike the United States, the Netherlands banned
lawyer advertising.98 This ban on advertising has resulted in consumer
advocacy organizations advertising class actions.99
One example of a legal foundation able to bring representative
actions in court is “Stichting Regres en Verhaal Schade en Kosten
Bouwfraude.”100 It was founded in June 2003 by several local municipalities
and translates to the “Foundation for Recourse and Recovery of Damages and
Costs resulting from Construction Fraud.”101 It is authorized to target
construction and other companies for “bid-rigging.”102 By February 2004, the
association had brought five cases to court as test cases.103
A 2004 report by the international firm Ashurst found that the
Netherlands and Austria were the only countries in Europe with pending class
action suits seeking damages.104 In June 2005, a damages verdict was granted
in favor of fifteen women who brought a class action suit against Akzo Nobel,
a Dutch chemical and drug company.105 The group alleged that the company
had a misleading advertising campaign in which the drug Implanon was
promoted as preventing conception when implanted in a woman’s arm.106 The
women became pregnant due to their reliance on this ineffective
contraceptive.107 Some of the women estimated their damages (the cost of
raising an unwanted child) at €1 million.108 The court found the company

95

Id.
Id.
97
Mark Wegener & Peter Fitzpatrick, Europe Gets Litigious, Class Actions and
Competition Enforcement May Change Europe’s Legal Culture, LEGAL TIMES, Vol.
XXVIII, No. 21, May 23, 2005, at 1.
98
Willett, supra note 1, at 15.
99
Id.
100
VerLoren van Themaat, et al., supra note 90, at 4.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Freedman, supra note 51, at 1.
105
Sherwood & Tait, supra note 18, at 6.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
96
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negligent and the women entitled to damages, the amount of which was being
reviewed.109
VI. SPAIN

The class action system in Spain is more limited than that of the
United States.110 Spanish class actions are rooted in Article 11 of the Civil
Procedure law.111 These class actions are “only available for the protection of
the rights of consumers and end-users.” 112 Other individuals who are affected
need to bring individual claims.113 The types of losses covered by class actions
are limited to physical and moral injury and economic loss.114
Generally, associations can sue to protect the rights and interests of
the consumers and users they represent, as well as the associations’ rights and
interests.115 Examples of associations that may bring class actions include:
consumer and user associations, legally recognized groups designed to defend
or protect consumers and users, and groups of impacted people where
members of the group comprise at least half of the total number of affected
persons.116 Where the number of people affected by the loss is unascertainable;
those consumer associations that are recognized by the law as representing
general consumer interests may bring a claim under the protection of intereses
difusos (diffused interests).117
In order to bring a class action, the requirements of the Civil
Procedure law (CPL) Article 11 must be met.118 Thus, associations formed by
individuals other than consumers or end-users, such as the “defendant’s
competitors, distributors or customers,” cannot bring an Article 11 class
action.119 If these parties are injured, they must sue individually, but may grant
a barrister power to represent them in a joint action. 120 A judgment rendered in
109

Id.
Id.
111
Ashurst, Discussions on Class Actions Across Europe (Dec. 2005).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 2.
115
Jesus Almoguera, et al., The Spain Report, at 6, DAMAGES ACTIONS FOR
THE INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION LAW AS LAID DOWN IN
available
at
ARTICLES
81
AND
82
EC,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/national_re
ports/spain_en.pdf (citing Civil Procedure Law [hereinafter CPL] art.11.1).
116
Id. (citing CPL art. 11.2, 11.3).
117
Id. (citing CPL art. 11.2, 11.3).
118
Id. at 6-7.
119
Id. at 7.
120
Id.
110
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this scenario will only bind the parties represented in that trial, rather than all
parties who could have chosen to join the suit.121
A joint action occurs
when several plaintiffs bring a set of claims with a common thread such that
the judge joins the claims.122 One judgment may be made which applies to all
the claims, but the claims are still treated individually, and awards are granted
separately to each set of plaintiffs.123
The court does not grant awards to the group as a whole, but rather to
each individual claimant.124 Thus, after the judgment, individuals must apply
to the court “to be recognized as a member of the class or group” and “to
quantify individual damages.”125 This process differs from class actions as
recognized by the European Union Comparative Report.126 The amount the
claimant is awarded should correspond with what they would have recovered
if the claimant had brought the action individually.127 The Spanish law has no
counterpart to punitive or exemplary damages. 128 While consumer associations
can bring damage actions, as of June 2005, no damage claims had been
brought.129
Attorney fee arrangements in Spain do not resemble those of
surrounding countries. Contingency fees are prohibited in Spain.130 However,
the client may award the lawyer a minimum fee based on the trial outcome.131
The employment of this type of fee arrangement depends solely on the
agreement between the lawyer and the client rather than the type of action.132
The only other European country to adopt this approach is Austria.133
VII. ITALY

Italy does not have class actions, but rather has collective actions.134
Lawmakers are considering a bill to give consumers better redress under these
121
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collective actions.135 The bill allows “consumer associations [identified by the
law], professional associations and the chamber of commerce… [to] apply to
the court… to obtain compensation of damages or the repayment of sums of
money owed to individual consumers directly,” where the damage is a result
of mass torts.136 These mass torts should be “in the context of contracts....
including those relating to consumers’ credit facilities, insurance and banking
relationships, financial instruments, investment and savings management
services, to the extent that these harm the rights of a plurality of
consumers.”137
Under this bill, the lawsuit would proceed in two or three phases: the
judgment or settlement, the dispute resolution mediation (which may be the
last stage), and the enforcement of the judgment by individual consumers.138
The judges may award damages when they enter a judgment.139 This
judgment should also include the judge’s criteria for awarding damages.140
Should the parties choose to settle, a judge will preside over the agreement.141
Following the judgment awarding damages or the settlement agreement, the
parties join in a “non-contentious resolution” of the lawsuit.142 The parties’
attorneys shall be present and the meeting will be chaired by a professional
mediator.143 “The dispute resolution chamber shall establish... the terms and
amount for settling the individual consumer’s potential claim.”144 If the
attorneys fail to come to a mediated agreement, the individual consumer may
pursue the action in court, where the court will certify that the individual meets
the criteria set forth in the judgment as well as the amount of damage
compensation owed.145 Then, “the judgment shall be enforceable against the
defendant.”146 The representative associations and chambers of commerce do
not have standing in this latter proceeding.147
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This bill was not intended to resemble the United States’ style of
class actions.148 Massimo Maggiore, an Ashurst attorney in Milan, says that
this is because Italy hopes “to reap the benefits of [class actions] but... adjust it
to a different system.”149 Rather, “the envisaged judicial tool is more akin to a
representative action than to a proper class action.”150
In November of 2005, a class action suit against Sony was filed in
both Italy and the United States. Electronic Frontiers Italy, an Italian digital
rights group, requested that the Italian Government investigate Sony’s
implementation of anti-piracy software.151 The software was designed to
protect CDs from copyright but could make Windows computers more
unreliable and slow them down.152 Sony was also accused of making it
difficult to obtain the software that could uninstall the program, XCP.153
VIII. GERMANY

2005 also brought collective claim advancements in Germany. On
November 1, 2005, Germany’s Capital Investors Model Proceedings Act
(CIMPA),
also
known
as
“KapMuG”
(KapitalanlegerMusterverfahrensgesestz), came into effect.154 Until now,
Germany has never had a collective action comparable to a United States class
action.155 However, rather than emulate the United States class action,
Germany pioneered a new way of forming collective actions within the
established framework of German civil procedure.156 The Federal Ministry of
Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection indicates that KapMuG creates an
instrument which “enables the enforcement of similar claims in the interest of
process economy and the saving of judicial resources dispensing with the
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disadvantages of the US-American class action, i.e. contingency fees and an
alliance of the injured parties which is debatable under constitutional law.”157
The KapMuG was created for specific types of disputes under the
Capital Markets law.158 The legislature’s primary aim was to reduce
procedural difficulties inherent in situations where large numbers of investors
file claims against a single defendant as was seen in Frankfurt with the
Deutshe Telekom case.159 In Deutshe Telekom, fifteen thousand investors
sought compensation for the company’s misleading statements by filing over
2,100 German lawsuits.160 The case may take up to ten years to litigate.161
Lawmakers hope the sort of judicial entanglement that was seen in Deutshe
Telekom can be avoided under the KapMug.
The law does not apply to other civil lawsuits, such as product
liability cases.162 Rather, “the law applies to proceedings at the first instance,
in which
(1) a claim for compensation of damages due to false,
misleading or omitted public capital markets
information or
(2) a claim to fulfillment of contract, which is based on an
offer under the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act
[SATA], is asserted.”163
Ashurst attorneys Karl Wach and Konrad Kern speculate that
KapMuG will potentially impact “all issuers of securities, offerors of other
investments, investment banks, members of their management or advisory
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boards and persons otherwise responsible for a prospectus, as well as for
bidders as defined in SATA.”164
The model proceeding develops in several stages.165 The process
begins with the “commencement of the action.” 166 At this stage, individuals
must file their own separate actions.167 Now, “the court at the seat of the issuer
has exclusive jurisdiction over all cases falling under CIMPA.”168
The second stage is the model proceeding application.169 Either party
may apply for the court’s establishment of a model case.170 In the application,
a party may attempt to establish the existence or nonexistence of various
conditions that would either justify or eliminate a potential claim.171 The
application may also be used to have specific legal questions addressed by a
higher court.172 The new electronic Complaint Registry logs the applications
on the Internet so that the public can access them.173
The model proceedings form the third stage of the suit.174 If ten
claims referring to a similar matter accumulate in the registry during a fourmonth period, the Higher Regional Court will take over jurisdiction of the
model proceeding.175 The court will select one of the claimants to file a
separate claim, and that claimant will serve as the model for the
proceedings.176 The court that previously had jurisdiction over the model
claimant’s case now has exclusive jurisdiction over all the cases filed under
the model proceeding.177 The Higher Regional Court tries the model
claimant’s case through the model proceeding and the other claimants may
participate and comment in these proceedings.178 All pending proceedings
where the decision is contingent upon the outcome of the model case are
suspended until the court issues a judgment in the model case.179
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Judgment on the model claim is the last stage of the proceedings.180
Once the Higher Regional Court issues its judgment, the judgment binds all
similar claims filed up until the date of the court’s decision.181 After the
judgment, the individual proceedings of each claimant are determined by the
lower court on their specific facts and points of law that did not relate the
model proceeding.182 The court trying the other claimants will rule based on
the precedent set in the model proceeding.183
The model proceeding can be settled, but all parties to the claims
must agree.184 Claimants seeking model proceedings do not incur any
additional court fees and, in fact, the normal advance payments of certain court
fees are suspended. 185
The Ministry of Justice claims the Act offers several advantages.186 It
notes that the Complaint Registry allows investors to monitor claims and
determine whether any proceedings relate to their own claims.187 Additionally,
the site may motivate the investors to file a claim themselves as model
proceedings spread the cost of the case over all claimants.188 Also, those who
issue securities or offer other investments can view the site for a timely
clarification of various legal issues.189 Further, the compilation of the claims
provides the court with a consistent standard with which to rule, while
reducing the overall burden on the judicial system.190
However, the new Act may have negative consequences for
businesses.191 The reform will probably increase the number of investor claims
overall.192 Specifically, the Complaint Registry will enable greater publicity of
claims and encourage other similarly situated individuals to join the case.193
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This further complicates the case and would probably increase both the length
of the trial and the financial vulnerability of the defendant.194
The legislature attempted to reduce these potentially negative
consequences for businesses by avoiding a variety of features characteristic of
US class actions.195 For instance, unnamed or unknown plaintiffs may not be
represented because model proceedings require individuals to initiate the
proceedings themselves.196 Germany has the “loser pays” rule and this rule
applies to model proceedings.197 Additionally, Germany does not have
contingent fees or punitive damages, and each individual claimant must prove
any compensatory damages.198 These rules should help to dissuade any
frivolous plaintiffs’ suits.
For the next five years, the legislature will monitor the effects of the
model proceedings.199 The Act has a “sunset clause,” which automatically
discontinues the Act on November 1, 2010.200 Should the legislature find the
Act successful, it can prolong the act or broaden its scope at that time.201
IX. FRANCE

Current French law does not have an equivalent to US style class
action suits.202 However, certain associations can bring a suit representing
several individual interests (“action en representation conjointe”) or collective
interests.203 In order to bring an “action en representation conjointe,” the
association must have an explicit mandate from the individual members
allowing representation before the association can represent their interests.204
The association cannot use the press to publicly ask for the mandate.205 In
regard to collective interest actions, the Administrative Supreme Court, known
194
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as the “Conseil d’Etat,” has allowed associations to bring actions to defend
either the association’s interests or the collective interests of those they
represent.206 Associations do not need authorization for these suits.207
In another type of action, the public prosecutor, the Minister for
Economic Affairs, or the chairman of the Competition Council can sue for
damages on behalf of individuals, but this action is limited to damages arising
from restrictive practices.208
In 1994, the French legislature passed a law allowing shareholders to
bind together to sue in associations.209 A minority shareholder is permitted to
bring action against a majority shareholder, but the company receives any
damages awarded.210 An example of this occurred when “Orange minority
shareholders challenged the fairness of the price offered in a buyout by
majority shareholder France Telecom.”211
In January 2005, French President Jacques Chirac proposed that
France strengthen consumer rights by developing US style class actions. 212
The announcement surprised many in the legal community and has evoked
great controversy.213 The Paris Bar Association and consumer groups support
Chirac’s proposal.214 The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the
office of Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, and Medef (an organization
representing the interests of French businesses) all oppose initiatives for
French class actions.215 Each of these parties believes that the introduction of
class actions would harm French business, particularly the financial sector.216
Thomas Donohue, President of the United States Chamber of Commerce,
visited Paris in January 2005 and made statements warning France to avoid US
style class actions.217 He asserted that their introduction would “damage the
economy and shift money from ‘good companies to lawyers.’”218 The
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president of Medef, Ernest-Antoine Seillie’re, hosted Donohue during his visit
and supported his stance, claiming that class actions could have “catastrophic
consequences” in France.219
President Chirac’s class action review task force issued its report
regarding the matter on December 16, 2005.220 The report was open for
consultation until March 1, 2006.221 At the conclusion of this period, the
French Government will issue a proposal.222 The December 16th, 2005
proposal attempted to balance “the need to protect the consumer” with the
“competitiveness of undertaking,” as well as adhere to the principles of French
law.223 The report outlined the status of group action in a variety of other
countries, provided a summary of current French law as it relates to the issue,
and set forth two possible class action models, one of which is inspired by
United States and Quebec class actions.224 Some French lawyers feared that if
Chirac’s proposal was passed, it would require further US style reforms such
as adjusted disclosure and discovery rules as well as relaxation on legal
advertising rules in order to be effective.225
French business groups have drawn assistance from US and Canadian
defense lawyers and businesses to lobby for class actions to be limited to only
those plaintiffs who actively join the class. This differs from US style class
actions where once a judge certifies a securities class action lawsuit, the
judgment applies to all investors, with the exception of those that opt out.226
The existence of a French contingency fee may be one of the reasons
that French plaintiffs’ attorneys desire to import class actions. Many
prominent Paris firms use contingency fees and are permitted to use the result
of the suit as part of the fee basis. 227 Also, while France does not adhere to a
loser pays rule, French judges do have the discretion to order the loser to pay a
portion of the prevailing party’s trial fees.228
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Though group actions are not currently permitted in France, some
lawyers in Paris have formed a collective legal action website called
classaction.fr.229 The site allows users to pay as little as €12 to register for a
lawsuit,230 but the site is entitled to 40% of any damages.231 Thus far, the
creator of the site, Jean-Marc Goldnadel claims he has “gather[ed] over 700
individuals in a potential suit against Universal Pictures, Warner Brothers, and
Columbia Tri-star” regarding a copy-protected DVD.232 The website
speculates that the claimants should receive awards up to €1,000.233 The
website has come under fire, as there have been allegations of ethical breaches
and a suit to shut the website down.234 Goldnadel also won a suit against
Medef, but had to remove the advertising from the site.235
As of December 2005, the site was defending against a new suit by
UFC-Que Choisir, a French consumer group and supporter of class actions. 236
The group claims that the site illegally recruits claimants and does not give the
claimant sufficient control in settlement decisions. 237 In addition, French class
action adversaries also oppose the site and use it as an example of the kinds of
problems that US style lawsuits entail, “ambulance-chasing lawyers, ruinous
damages awards and spurious lawsuits used to blackmail companies into
settlement.”238
X. CONCLUSION

As class actions have expanded in Europe, the debate surrounding
this legal apparatus continues on a global scale. Critics note that when there is
a lack of common interest between the class members, a class action fails to
provide the class members and defendants with “individualized determination
of their disputes.”239 Additionally, critics feel class actions give plaintiffs an
229
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unfair advantage when bargaining by increasing defendant’s risk of
damages.240 One writer summarized other criticisms as follows:
(1) Damage class actions are solely the creatures of class
action attorneys’ entrepreneurial incentives.
(2) It is easy to detect non-meritorious class actions and
most suits are non-meritorious.
(3) The benefits of class actions accrue primarily to lawyers
who bring them.
(4) Transaction costs far outweigh benefits to the class and
society.
(5) Existing rules are not adequate to insure that class
actions serve their public goals.241
On the contrary, advocates for class actions highlight their positive
attributes.242 Class actions lessen the burden on the courts and the economy by
bundling cases that would otherwise require trying the cases separately.243
Additionally, resolving multiple yet related claims in a single trial provides a
“consistency and finality” that is important for both efficiency and public
confidence in the judiciary.244
Class actions balance the sometimes overwhelming differential
between a large corporation and a small plaintiff. Plaintiffs with small claims
often do not have enough incentive to bring a suit to redress legitimate wrongs,
as the cost or hassle of the suit can exceed the damages. However, by bundling
the claims, plaintiffs increase their leverage, which in turns provides
opportunities where one did not exist previously.
Empowering the plaintiffs could lead to greater corporate
responsibility. By punishing them through large settlements, the courts are
speaking a language that businesses understand: money. If enough financial
disincentive for ethical shortcuts and unsafe products are created, then we may
actually see some real changes in businesses worldwide.
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Some commentators have speculated that the increase of class action
legislation among European nations could lead to a uniform European law on
class actions.245 In 2002, the European Commission appointed Lovells to study
the product liability laws and their application in the European Union and to
consider the possibility of reform.246 One suggested reform was the
introduction of product liability class or representative actions.247 The study
also suggested “greater harmonization in the EU of product liability laws
under the directive.”248 The directive had already instituted measures to
achieve this harmonization, such as a no-fault liability system.249 The Lovell
study found the directive generally accepted as a product liability feature in the
European Union.250 Overall, the Lovell study concluded that there was no need
for directive reform at that point.251 The broad acceptance of the directive in
European Union countries helped to partly form the basis of this conclusion.252
More recently, the European Commission requested that Ashurst
conduct a similar study.253 The study was published in 2005.254 The study
examined the “conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC
antitrust rules.”255 Partial motivation for the study was the “well-established”
finding that “private enforcement of the EC competition rules is lagging
behind public enforcement.”256 The Ashurst study served as empirical support
for the European Commission Green Paper on the topic. 257 Nicholas Bessot,
attorney for Ashurst Paris and co-author of the French Report for the study,
notes that the Green Paper issued by the European Commission concludes that
one possibility for addressing private enforcement of competition laws could
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include the introduction or development of “class/group/collective actions in
EU Member States.”258
Marc Gottridge, a securities lawyer for Lovells, doubts that such a
change will occur in the near future, in part because the European Commission
has yet to finish uniting the European securities laws.259 He also asserts that
even if all the class action initiatives in Europe pass, plaintiffs such as
institutional investors will still prefer bringing class actions in US courts due
to the more favorable rules of “pre-trial evidence gathering, jury trials, and
punitive damage awards.”260 Additionally, Gottridge doubts that Europe will
abandon its traditional stances on loser pays rules and the prohibition of
contingency fees, both of which also make the United States a more favorable
plaintiff’s forum.261
The next few years will reveal whether or not Europe pursues a
uniform policy on class actions. Some feel that this could hinge on the
acceptance of the French class action. However, regardless of whether Europe
decides to implement a unifying policy, now is an exciting time for class
actions in Europe. The differing approaches taken by countries such as the
United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, and potentially France, will provide
ample opportunity for the study of the strength and weakness of collective
actions as applied in a variety of ways.
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